

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. MGFA-6399

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attn: ☒
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *CB*

DATE: 18 March 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OPERATIONAL

SPECIFIC— Progress Report
KIBITZ Plans and Training

Ref: MGFA-6398 *not logged in yet*

*Continued
#14911's
#14912's*
DOCUMENT NO. _____

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒

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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____

5/5/52

REVIEWER: (C)

1. As mentioned in paragraph 3(c) of the above-referenced memo, some progress has been made toward formalizing operational plans for Kibitz teams. Specifically, since Kibitz 15 still seems to believe that his project is our one and only effort in Kibitz type operations, he has assumed the initiative to prepare his teams with written activation schedules, operations plans, assigned targets, maps, etc. Further, inasmuch as Kibitz agents are suddenly being thrust into what is for them an entirely new field, and for which we are not equipped to train them, he has included a brief guide to intelligence, how it is obtained and how reported. And, in full appreciation of the circumstances of danger and adverse propaganda under which these teams will be called upon to activate, the preface has been seasoned with a bit of "why we fight" patter which should serve to buck up the team leader and provide him with ammunition to stimulate his team assistants.

2. With these efforts taking shape, it became quite clear that here in the making was an operations plan pattern which, with appropriate modifications, could be made to suit all Kibitz agents' needs. We therefore brought one of these plans in for assessment and critique by staff members and from comments thus far received, it appears K-15 is not too far off. Certainly as a starter it comes closer to fulfilling the requirement than anything we have ever seen or could begin to prepare for him. And, guided by the consensus of staff comment here, it would appear to be most expedient to accept K-15's work for what it is; a one-man staff draft of an effort to cover a great field which now needs revisions under guidance of experts in each field. K-15 himself is now asking for just this very guidance (which he should have had in the first place). However, at the time he first started the work, it was visualized to be as only a few rough field notices or guides to the teams and, as such, K-15 used to compose and type directly on the mimeo mat, most often with a portable typewriter in his parked automobile. (This, while not excusing one of the greater faults, does account for the detracting roughness and many areas of redundancies. At the same time, as one reads through page after page of diverse matter, each written without benefit of erasure or retraction, one gains a glimpse

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privileges

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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of the man's versatility.) Now, however, as the full magnitude and potential become apparent so as to justify a reworking of the material, we believe it should be awarded honest consideration by experts of the various departments who can thus guide the project to not only a more finished product for his own net, but to develop a basic manual which could serve all Kibitzes. Toward this accomplishment we wish to send K-15 to Washington where proper assistance can be afforded him. //

3. For further consideration, we are pouching one of the operations' plans as a sample. Unfortunately, this plan is not near completion nor of the best, but while the whole team is under re-assessment because of reports of the team leader having been too outspokenly anti-communist, it is felt that this plan can best be afforded for extensive study. And since we have already mutilated it by gluing page by page translations in order to encourage and facilitate full consideration by Washington, you may feel free to dissect it in any manner deemed necessary for analysis. In fact, with Washington giving us help in this project, we should never need this old plan again. //

4. At the outset, one should not be immediately discouraged by its bulk. The looseleaf folder as it is being forwarded, contains 7 manila folders; 1 (grey) for the team leader; 1 (brown) for the communications man; 3 (red) for the team assistants and 2 (green) for the headquarters base station. In addition are 4 envelopes containing related maps. We are forwarding the whole thing for Washington's appraisal of the first need to cut down the bulk by professional editing and more concise re-production. However, for the immediate problem at hand, one need only concern himself with the team leader folder (grey) which contains all the essentials of a typical operations' plan. //

5. In order to save unnecessary re-hashing of the same points, we are pouching also the comments already received from [] and [] as they made the translations and [] and [] who kindly gave of their time to look over the work and offer their suggestions. Considering these and other verbal comments we have received, it is quite obvious that all agree to the need, intent and content of the manuscript, but the approach allows for much individuality in authorship by specialists in each field. These can be reconciled with expedience only by concentrated committee work. And, expedience is the note of today. We have long been in need of many of the aspects of K-15's presentation. Particularly those elements which are to serve as introduction and guides to intelligence operations. True, the training division has been supplying papers on this type of required training, but they are slanted more to case officers for the training of agents. While we can't speak for other operations, we here, for many reasons, would find it utterly impossible to assemble our agents for that type of instruction. Rather, we and K-15 visualize the end product of this project to be a concise point by point introduction to our type of intelligence activity; a veritable self-teaching handbook for Kibitz type agents, to which need be added only enclosures of special EEIs for the individual agent. And knowing K-15 as we do, we feel confident he will get the job done with half a helping hand.

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6. There is one other point in consideration of bringing Kibitz 15 to Washington. This case officer is leaving the project within a few weeks. While no replacement has as yet been designated, it will almost necessarily be someone new to Kibitz type operations. It follows then that there will be an indefinite interval during which K-15 will logically enough know more about this type of operation than the case officer. That K-15 is an aggressive dynamic character is apparently no news to Washington. We have here in hand no less than four references to Washington's apprehension in that respect. Now, having been born to this type of operation we have always felt confident on operational grounds, however much later Washington policy sometimes has suggested conflict. But the entire burden on new staff personnel would be an unwarranted responsibility. Maybe we underestimate the capacities of new staff members in the field, but we do not underestimate K-15. And though we do not wish to imply that K-15 might get the bit in his teeth, we do think Washington should take some responsibility in keeping him headed in the right direction. Our plan, as presented, to send him to Washington for an assist in working out the operational plans' project, would be most opportune for Washington to get to know him and orient him to Washington's satisfaction. Certainly the assets he represents as well as he himself justify this investment in him. He is not a run-of-the-mine agent. Rather, other comparisons failing, he could be likened to one of our West Point career officers civilianized to a GS 12 or 13. In fact, we know of few staff members who would be able to produce in this field as he has. And possibly after complete briefing and assessment, Washington in the confidence of its own judgment, might even wish to reconsider his employment arrangement to that of contract employee. *What does this mean?*

7. We feel the foregoing grounds sufficient so we won't labor the morale aspects of showing this man the greatness of the things we stand for. *This is not a bad idea. E.C.*

1. Your help in rescreening K-15's ^{U.S.P.} ops will be greatly appreciated.
2. I will review the **SECRET** question of K-15's **SECURITY INFORMATION** U.S. travel & submit recommendations. Right now, I'm not sure he can be spared nor am I certain that you are in a position to be of much help to him. Request your views on this point. H.E.C.